Is Biden Strategy Bad?
Long delayed the Biden National Security Strategy finally sees the light of day.
Almost half way through the president’s term, his administration published its national security strategy. This is like authoring the script half-way through the play. There are few surprises here. Least of all this is not a strategy. The White House just published a glossy brochure of what it already “thinks” it is doing.
To be honest, as we wrote before we thought Biden policies were not very good. The strategy just affirms that conclusion.
We are going to do two things here.
One is we are going to give you a quick once over of what is and what is not in the strategy.
Two—we are going to explain what a real national security strategy ought to look like.
Sounds like fun right?
Also, thanks to Tom Spoehr and other great analysts at the Heritage Foundation who pitched in on this.
What’s the bottom line? It is not a strategy. Instead, the President’s National Security Strategy---meant to guide the administration’s efforts to counter pressing external dangers—is comprised of a litany of the administration’s accomplishments and a recitation of progressive domestic issues, packaged as threats to the security of the United States. Within the strategy’s 47 pages, only four deal with China and Russia, and but one----a mere 830 words of 23,000---describes the role of the U.S. military to counter external threats. The other 42 pages are devoted to such topics as the challenges from climate change, pandemics, food insecurity, and domestic terrorism.
What’s just plain wrong? Completely absent is any indication the administration believes that the U.S. military needs to grow to meet the challenge from China, even though our military leaders have repeatedly told us that is the case.
There is way too much politics in the strategy. For example, out of place in the security strategy is the assertion the administration is “building on the work of generations of activists to advance equity and root out systemic disparities in our laws, policies, and institutions.” (Given that equity has come to mean the opposite of equality and means now a call for government to treat individuals differently according to their race—a point that Vice President Harris has emphasized repeatedly—it is doubtful if any action that follows these guidelines will survive legal scrutiny)
What about the rest of the world? The portion of the strategy that deals with the major regions of the world further disappoints. The biggest regional section of the strategy deals with our own Western Hemisphere, yet there is no mention of the current U.S. border crisis, where there were 200,000 illegal alien apprehensions in July 2022 alone. The strategy is completely silent on the topic of border security which is currently allowing a torrent of illegal drugs, criminals, and potential terrorists to enter the country.
What’s Next? This document will be old news by the weekend. What is key is that it really does reflect that for this administration rather than politics “ending at the water’s edge,” foreign policy is seen as an extension of domestic politics. That is an approach to foreign policy in the Biden administration that will likely remain till the end of the term.
So let’s think about what a serious strategy would look like. This was an issue addressed in major assessment of Biden’s foreign and security policy and how to fix it. Part of this study specifically addresses how to craft a real strategy. America needs a serious strategy. The critical components for successful strategy-making are too important to neglect. There are standards against which serious strategies should be measured. Let us define them and illustrate with real-world examples against which America’s policymakers should be judged.
What is strategy? Real strategy is intended to drive a level of performance or achievement that cannot be accomplished now. That is the aim of real strategy.
For instance, the U.S. strategy of containment during the Cold War, while implemented differently by Presidents over time, was the guide to action for addressing competition with the Soviet Union.
President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953), considered the “father of containment” with British Prime Minister Atlee and Russia’s Stalin.
How do you know you need a real strategy? The problem can be solved without dramatic change, there is no need for a strategy. Therefore, a strategy, by definition, involves some extraordinary “hard” choices. Every problem has competing interests, requirements, goals, and trade-offs. Sorting them out, defining the crucially important ones, and committing resources to that end is the purpose of strategy. If the hard choice is not clear and decisive, it is not a real strategy.
Perhaps the best exemplar is the Allied strategy chosen for World War II that made the hard choice of committing to “defeat Germany first.”
Allies landing in Normandy, France on D-Day 1944.
How do you know what is most important in a strategy? For national strategy, hard choices are about getting the hierarchy of interests right. For the United States, the most essential interests are “vital” interests that can directly affect the security and livelihood of the American people. Next are “important” interests that provide the United States significant advantages in global competition and safeguard the lives and livelihoods of Americans from foreign threats. Finally, there are “peripheral” interests that would offer some benefits to the United States and U.S. policies, but the amount of attention and action would be commensurate with the values obtained. A strategy should focus on the most critical vital interests. A strategy should be about “must do” actions.
In 1953, for example, President Dwight Eisenhower organized the Solarium Project, a strategic exercise focused on protecting key vital interests in prosecuting the Cold War, including national defense and ensuring a robust, growing economy.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) was a master strategist.
What needs to be in a strategy? A strategy should be an all-encompassing and deliberate guide to action. That means it should address sufficiently and equally well the ends (the objectives of the strategy), ways (how the strategy will be accomplished), and means (the critical resources or capabilities that will be used to implement the strategy). A strategy does not need to describe every task that must be done (which could range from terrorism and disaster response to hybrid threats and proxy wars), but a complete strategy will effectively guide other activities that must be planned and adapt to changing conditions and requirements as plans are implemented. A complete strategy should describe the critical tasks that must be accomplished.
One criticism of U.S. strategy during the Vietnam War, for example, is that it did not properly formulate an effective course for fighting the war—a “theory of winning.” Instead, President Johnson adopted an incremental series of measures that ultimately proved inadequate.
Vietnam (1955-1975), still America’s longest and least successful war.
How do you know a strategy is good enough? A complete and decisive strategy is not necessarily a good one. Napoleon, for instance, had a clear and decisive strategy for defeating Russia in 1812. He still suffered a crushing defeat. A sound strategy should offer good prospects for success, including being suitable (appropriate to solve the challenge addressed), feasible (can be accomplished with available—even if currently untapped—resources), and acceptable (supported by the stakeholders, chiefly the American people).
Napoleon’s 1812 campaign satisfied only two criteria. His strategy was feasible only if he could decisively defeat the Russian army before winter set in. When that failed, Napoleon was forced into a humiliating retreat that cost him his army and his crown.
French retreat from Moscow (1812), Napoleon’s most humiliating defeat (Yale University Art Gallery)
Biden’s problem is his strategy fails to adequately address everyone of these key questions. That’s why it will be so forgettable.