In China, angry protestors are everywhere
Update 12/15/2022
According to Reuters, “China raced to vaccinate its most vulnerable people in anticipation of waves of COVID infections, with some analysts expecting the death toll to soar after it eased strict controls that had kept the pandemic at bay for three years. COVID infections were exploding in China well before the government's decision to abandon its strict 'zero-COVID' policy, a World Health Organization director said.”
The implication here is that the regime is far from out of the woods on this issue and there is a bumpy road ahead both for political stability and the economy.
Update 12/7/2022
Read more.
Update 12/2/2022
We update our stories when there are significant developments. Here is the latest on China’s COVID crackdown and the nationwide protests that followed.
Various statements by senior Chinese officials, as well as Chinese media, in the past couple days indicated a changing propaganda narrative about COVID-19. They cite health officials stating that studies have conclusively shown that Omicron variants are much les dangerous than the original variant (they would have been severely punished for making such statements just a couple weeks ago). The government also released an official target for vaccinations of the elderly (90% of those 80 and over having at least one dose by the end of January). Key statements have also neglected to mention “dynamic clearing” of COVID-19 cases (the official name of the zero-COVID policy), and have emphasized “optimizing” pandemic controls. If “dynamic clearing” is not mentioned during the Politburo meeting, then that will probably mean it is no longer the central government’s official policy.
Do not expect a 180-degree shift in China’s COVID-19 policies. The propaganda narrative is shifting now to allow restrictions to gradually be eased. This will be a lengthy process, and the government will almost certainly tighten restrictions if infections/deaths exceed what they are prepared to deal with or if its healthcare system is under strain
Update 11/30/2022
Here is the latest on this story. Things seem to be reaching a tipping point in China, as demonstrations against COVID restrictions continue to escalate, but in the last days, according to press reporting, the regime has moved decisively to suppress them. Our basic assessment below remains the same.
Update 11/28/2022
We like to update our stories when we get new info. Here is an interesting take from the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Center Director, Jeff Smith.
Why has China has persisted with Zero COVID when it's doing so much damage and so many countries have moved on? My intuition tells me Zero COVID was viewed as a success early on and Xi was quick to take credit. When Zero COVID became closely tied to Xi's legacy, and a symbol of his wisdom and sound policy guidance, it became very hard to roll back or change course.
I discussed this further with a friendly China watcher in India, who spent many years reporting from Beijing and always seems to have good insights. He agreed with my assessment but added some important texture: China's initial vaccination push was specifically targeted to 18-59 year olds. This left a lot of elderly unvaccinated and created the impression vaccines weren't safe for the elderly. (Chinese propaganda against Western vaccines also didn't help).
Xi says to fully open up safely China would want to get to 95% of the elderly population with at least three shots, like Japan. They're stuck at 40% and are struggling to get the number higher. They fear mass elderly deaths and a strain on the healthcare system if they abandon Zero COVID. So they botched the initial response and had a bad vaccine policy and now they're finding it difficult to admit the failure or walk it back.
Also, here is more reporting on the protests.
Original Post
According to the latest press reporting, significant protests against COVID restrictions have erupted all over China, including for calls for Xi and other top officials to step down or be removed. (news story-access required)
We turned to Asia policy expert Michael Cunningham for an update.
So what is the bottom line here? Very significant, but unlikely to seriously threaten Xis or the Party's hold on power. It is nearly impossible for protests to challenge the CCPs hold on power unless they result in a split in the leadership, which is even less likely now following the Party Congress (a story we have reported on before).
Why won’t Xi lose his grip on power? It will take a lot more disruption and adversity to shake the party’s hold on power. Remember the public's response to the COVID death of Li Wenliang (one of the first doctors to be silenced after warning of a SARS-like coronavirus in 2019) in Feb 2020 also seemed at first to delegitimize the Party and even caused Xi to disappear for a month or two, but in the end Xi managed to use COVID to strengthen his and the Party's hold on power.
So what do we learn from the protests? What this certainty does show is how controversial Xi is, especially among the educated public, and how fed up people are getting with his zero COVID policies and general disintegration of freedom in China. What is unprecedented about this is that, while protests are usually against local government officials, in some of these protests, crowds are openly calling for the CCP and Xi to step down.
This all raises the question of how these events will impact how China treats the rest of the world. That’s an open question. There are few signs this domestic activity has significantly shifted China’s external behavior.
There is much speculation over the outcome the recent Xi-Biden discussions. Both sides suggested that the two leaders established clear “guardrails” on future relationships. The official U.S. readout states, Washington “will continue to compete vigorously with the PRC, including by investing in sources of strength at home and aligning efforts with allies and partners around the world. He reiterated that this competition should not veer into conflict…” This, however, merely seems like a restatement of U.S. strategy, “compete where we must, cooperate where we can.” Both the U.S. readout and strategy, however, are completely inconsistent with the goals expressed in the October meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or suggest how the U.S. China can resolve a host of fundamental differences on challenges from human rights and Taiwan (a story we have written about before) to intellectual property theft and China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The most likely scenario is that China will continue its aggressive foreign policies, assert stronger domestic controls, and continue the economic strategy outlined at the party congress. In the U.S., expect sharpened competition between Congressional leaders looking to take a harder stance on China and the administration which appears committed to "managing" the relationship rather than exploiting China's internal discord or diminished brand overseas. The ambivalence of U.S. policy will continue to bedevil friends and allies, some looking to break with China, others trying to triangulate between the U.S. and Beijing, and still others who think China can offer more to them than the West.
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This isn't a surprise. It shouldn't be a surprise. There was always going to be a tipping point.